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The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged – All that 
remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, 
success depends in Most Enterprizes of the kind, & for want of it, they are generally defeated, 
however well planned….”   
— General George Washington to Col. Elias Dayton, July 26: 1777.[1] 
Introduction 
It is comforting to know that the tension between America’s desire for transparency in its 
government’s activities and the secrecy required for effective intelligence operations predates the 
Republic. For much of its history, America ingeniously dealt with the transparency vice secrecy 
dilemma by either disbanding or shrinking its small intelligence services after every military 
conflict. As Mark Lowenthal points out, the United States did not have a national intelligence 
organization for 170 years of its existence.[2] Indeed, it was not until the 1880s that the U.S. Navy 
and Army, alarmed by the rapid technological advances of their European counterparts, 
established small and permanent intelligence organizations with dedicated budgets and 
personnel. Since these military intelligence organizations were focused primarily on foreign 
military capabilities, and operated for the most part overseas, they received little media or 
congressional attention.  
The modern U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) can trace its history back to 1940; and, especially 
with the passing of the National Security Act of 1947.[3] In the wake of the successful Japanese 
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and the emerging Soviet conventional and eventual nuclear 
threat in the post-World War II era, successive presidents built and maintained robust intelligence 
capabilities, which today consist of seventeen agencies, with approximately 100,000 employees 
and budgets well over $44 billion a year.[4]  
For clarity, this article assumes that by intelligence secrecy, one means that, with few exceptions, 
the executive branch and its subordinate intelligence agencies decide who will be given access to 
sensitive intelligence on sources and methods, and at times, covert operations. Conversely, the 
demand for greater transparency and oversight of U.S. intelligence activities would come from an 
American public suspicious of such concentration of power within the executive branch. 
Intelligence transparency therefore means a greater oversight role for the American public’s 
representatives in the legislative and judicial branches of government, as well as the media, to 
ensure the U.S. IC is carrying out its mission effectively and efficiently, legally, and in a manner 
consistent with the values, rights and privacy of its citizens. The U.S. Government’s challenge is 
therefore to find the proper balance, under our Constitution, between intelligence secrecy, 
accountability and transparency.  
Despite America’s long history of checks and balances among its executive, legislative and 
judicial branches of government, the concept of separation of powers as it pertains to intelligence 
activities is a relatively new phenomenon. The historical record of the executive branch complying 
with legislative and judicial oversight of intelligence activities dates back only to the mid-1970s. 
Since then, the process has been uneven at best. While General George Washington worked 
closely with the pre-Constitutional Congress during the Revolutionary War (both maintained 
complementary intelligence organizations), after that period, the executive branch for the most 
part kept Congress out of intelligence affairs until the mid-1970s.[5] Over the decades, Congress 
occasionally made feeble attempts at oversight, specifically to see how the money it had 
appropriated for secret, intelligence-related activities was being spent, only to be rebuffed by the 
President. For example, in 1846, the House of Representatives issued a resolution for President 
James K. Polk to produce records of the Secret Service Fund expenditures during the previous 
administration. Polk refused on the grounds of national security, and Congress did not pursue the 
issue.[6]  
The Need for Secrecy 
George Washington’s wartime plea aside, Americans have always been wary of professional 
intelligence services insisting that their activities remain secret, even from other branches of the 
U.S. Government. Such secrecy seems at odds with the America’s democratic principles, 
specifically the need for openness and transparency in government affairs. This skepticism 
proved justified when in the 1970s and 80s, the press and Congress uncovered numerous 
examples of the U.S. IC engaging in illegal and ethically-suspect activities.[7]  
Many citizens today are again questioning the IC’s activities, including its competence and 
professionalism after learning about serious intelligence failures leading up to the 9/11 attacks in 
September 2001, and prior to the Iraq war in March 2003. These very public failures, combined 
with controversial practices such as renditions and detentions of terrorism suspects, warrant-less 
searches and widespread eavesdropping against U.S. citizens, have sparked greater demand for 
transparency in intelligence-related activities.[8]  
However, secrecy remains a key component of the United States' IC’s effectiveness. 
Compromised sensitive technical and human intelligence “sources and methods” will often lead to 
either the loss of that specific source of intelligence, or worse, the opportunity for our targeted 
adversary to pass phony or misleading information through the compromised sources as part of 
an elaborate deception operation. Two experts on intelligence, Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. 
Schmitt, point out that secrecy is essential in all aspects of intelligence since the target is a 
human adversary who is fighting back. They point out that, “One side’s intelligence failure is likely 
to be another side’s counterintelligence success.”[9]  
A cursory review of intelligence activities during World War II clearly shows the critical importance 
of secrecy during wartime. Key technical intelligence collection capabilities, such as the massive 
British communication intelligence (COMINT) collection and decryption effort against Hitler’s war 
machine, codenamed ULTRA, or America’s counterpart effort to collect and break Imperial 
Japan’s PURPLE code, codenamed MAGIC, were instrumental in assisting the United States and 
its allies prevail in World War II. Allied successes at D-Day, the Battle of Midway and countless 
other battles in both the European and Pacific theaters can be traced backed to the intelligence 
advantages afforded the allies, and were only possible because the ULTRA and MAGIC COMINT 
programs remained secret throughout the war.[10]  
During the Cold War, secret technical intelligence capabilities allowed us to penetrate the closed 
Soviet bloc. The brilliant aircraft designer, Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, and his team at Lockheed 
Martin’s famous “skunk works,” working with the CIA and the Pentagon, developed both the U-2 
and SR-71 Blackbird state-of-the-art imagery intelligence (IMINT) reconnaissance aircraft in 
secret in the 1950s. After testing, the U-2 began secret reconnaissance flights over the Soviet 
Union until an aircraft, piloted by Gary Frances Powers, was shot down on one such mission in 
1960. Despite that setback, in October 1962, U.S. Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft played a 
pivotal role in uncovering the secret deployment of Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles 
(IRBMs) to Cuba capable of delivering nuclear warheads against major cites on the U.S. eastern 
seaboard. That secretly-collected intelligence allowed the Kennedy administration to conduct 
timely diplomatic intervention which supported a peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
with the Soviet Union. Despite its advanced age, updated U-2 aircraft remain operational today, 
although with significantly upgraded sensor capabilities that remain secret.[11]  
In the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration first authorized the CIA and USAF to begin 
building reconnaissance satellites with secret collection capabilities. Over the past five decades, 
these satellites have assisted U.S. intelligence collection efforts around the world, especially in 
denied areas where other forms of collection were impractical. As was true in World War II, 
secrecy about the capabilities of these high-tech collection platforms, and the targets they are 
tasked to collect against, is essential to prevent the targeted adversaries from implementing 
countermeasures such as camouflage and other forms of deception.  
An example of the high cost associated with the compromise of a sophisticated technical 
intelligence collection effort is Project Jennifer, also known as the Hughes Glomar Explorer. This 
specially-designed marine salvage ship was built in 1973 by Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock 
Company to retrieve a sunken Soviet Golf-II Class ballistic missile submarine lost on April 11, 
1968, 750 miles northwest of Hawaii at an approximate depth of 17,000 feet. According to an 
account by the Federation of American Scientists, the Glomar Explorer cost in excess of $200 
million to build (a contemporaneous Time Magazine article placed the cost of the entire operation 
at $350 million). The Glomar Explorer made only one voyage to collect the submarine in June 
1974. According the press, the mission was only partially successful before the Los Angeles 
Times broke the story in February 1975. With its cover blown, the Glomar Explorer’s brief career 
as an expensive covert intelligence collection platform was over.[12]  
The compromise of costly technical collection sources and methods is usually measured in 
dollars and lost intelligence collection opportunities; whereas the compromise of human 
intelligence (HUMINT) agents working for the U.S. IC, or our allies, is often measured in lost lives, 
and the unwillingness of other potential agents around the world to work with U.S. intelligence. 
Former CIA spy Aldrich Ames identified 25 CIA “human assets” to the Soviet KGB in the mid-
1980s in return for $ 2.7 million; most of those agents Ames betrayed—who were unable to 
escape to the West—were tried and executed.”[13] In addition to Aldrich Ames, there have been 
a number of high-profile cases of treason involving individuals working for the U.S. IC. On May 14, 
2002, career FBI agent and counter-intelligence expert, Robert Hansen, pleaded guilty to fifteen 
counts of espionage and conspiracy. The previous year, one of the two charges formally laid out 
against him in an Alexandria, Virginia courtroom was that he revealed the identities of three KGB 
men in October 1989 who worked as double agents for the United States. The CIA believes that 
the three were subsequently executed.[14] Such widely publicized examples of U.S. intelligence 
unable to protect the identities of their human sources can have had a chilling effect on the 
willingness of others to cooperate with U.S. intelligence. The risk of compromise is just too great.  
While secrecy is a key ingredient in intelligence collection, its role in analysis is more complex, 
and at times, counterproductive. Like other living systems, nations and non-state actors are 
complex entities. Understanding how they work, think, communicate, make decisions and interact 
with those around them usually takes a collective effort, pulling together the knowledge of many 
experts with various backgrounds. Many such experts may not have security clearances, and 
may not be able to obtain them due to many circumstances. Excessive secrecy will, by definition, 
limit the number and type of experts who can participate in the all-source analysis, which can 
undermine the quality of the final intelligence product. Excessive secrecy will limit the information 
one can apply to a specific problem thus forcing less-knowledgeable analysts to wittingly or 
unwittingly fill in the blanks with their biases and, at times, secret information of questionable 
reliability. The question remains, how much should the IC limit participation in its analytical efforts 
in order to maintain secrecy? At what point does the quest for secrecy become self-defeating?  
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has always contributed to all-source analysis, yet the 
information revolution has added a major new dimension to the battle between transparency and 
secrecy. Like Sam Colt’s six-shooter of the Old West, the Internet and powerful, publicly-available 
search engines are the new “great equalizers” of the 21st Century information wars. These widely 
available information technologies have eroded much of the information advantage once enjoyed 
by only a small number of wealthy countries with large intelligence bureaucracies capable of 
sifting though tons of printed material or terabytes of information on massive databases.  
For example, Google Earth, which was unveiled in June 2005, has satellite imagery, mapping 
overlays, GPS features, and various other toolkits U.S. intelligence analysts would have drooled 
over in the 1990s. According to Google’s John Hanke, “ten years ago, this technology was the 
exclusive province of the U.S. IC. Five years ago, it cost $14,000 for a single satellite image. Now 
there’s free, global high-resolution imagery.”[15] Heady stuff indeed, but what it also means is 
that any al-Qaida terrorist with a hotmail account, from any Internet café around the world, can 
now access information that previously was the purview of only a handful of large state actors. 
Earlier this year, British forces in Basra, Iraq claimed they found sets of photographs of Google 
Earth mapping tool during raids of suspected insurgents’ homes. The annotated photographs 
were of the palace complex in Basra where over 1,000 British soldiers are stationed.[16]  
Even the U.S. IC is struggling to better leverage this tsunami of open source information, while at 
the same time maintaining the secrecy of its remaining technical and human sources and 
methods. It is becoming increasingly clear that those precious few secret technical and human 
sources and methods are the only remaining intelligence advantages that the United States and 
its allies have over a wide range of actual and potential state and non-state adversaries.  
The Case for Transparency  
All major democratic government activities require oversight and accountability, both internal and 
external, to ensure they are performing their mission competently, operating within the law, and 
using the taxpayers’ resources in an efficient and effective manner. This oversight requirement is 
essential for the intelligence community since most of its activities are conducted under the cloak 
of secrecy; not subject to many of the traditional safeguards common in other governmental 
agencies. For much of the U.S. IC’s history, Congress, the media and the American publics’ 
attitude towards intelligence varied from trust, disinterest to occasional outrage when scandals 
were revealed. As the late LTG Vernon Walters, USA (ret.), former U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, once said, “Americans have always 
had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, 
and when they don't, they regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral.”[17]  
Following September 11th, the American public and their elected officials definitely wanted a lot 
of it, and they were more than willing to suspend traditional safeguards to civil liberties to make 
sure they got it. Congress passed, with virtually no debate, the USA PATRIOT ACT just 45 days 
after September 11th attacks. Few, at the time, questioned the Intelligence Community’s need for 
expanded powers or complete secrecy to aggressively pursue the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible 
for the 9/11 attacks. Many in Congress willingly ceded their traditional oversight responsibilities to 
the executive branch in an effort to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the interagency 
intelligence fight against a pernicious enemy they did not understand. However, following the 
revelations in the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, better known as 9/11 Commission, as well as the U.S. failure to find Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) in Iraq in 2003, and numerous media reports of warrant-less wiretaps and 
other forms of “data-mining” against U.S. citizens, the American public and Congress are once 
again demanding more congressional oversight of the U.S. IC.  
A Washington Post-ABC News Poll conducted in December 2006, showed 66 percent of the 
1,005-person random sample questioned believe that the FBI and other agencies were “intruding 
on some Americans’ privacy rights” in terrorism investigations, up from 58 percent in September 
2003.[18] A subset of those polled showed 52 percent wanted congressional hearings on how the 
Bush Administration handles surveillance, detainees and other terrorism-related issues.[19]  
As for the IC’s effectiveness, many citizens and their elected officials were justifiably outraged by 
many of the 9/11 Commission findings. The bipartisan Commission, mandated by Congress, 
issued a report that served as an exposé of the IC’s handling of the intelligence leading up to the 
attacks on September 11th.[20] The Commission’s findings provided the impetus for executive 
and legislative intelligence reform efforts, specifically the creation of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) in December 2004.  
On the heels of 9/11, another serious “intelligence failure” was the IC’s pre-war assessment of 
Saddam Hussein’s chemical, biological and nuclear “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) 
programs. The IC’s findings were formally presented in an October 2002 National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE), requested by Congress, prior to the House and Senate vote to authorize the 
President to use force against Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 address to 
the United Nations contained many of the same intelligence sources used in the NIE to make the 
case for war to the world. It was only after the invasion that the public learned that many of the 
sources used in the NIE and then Secretary of State’s U.N. speech were known fabricators, and 
that the all-source analysis was sloppy at best.[21]  
Several congressional commissions were established to investigate what went wrong. On 
February 6, 2004, Executive Order 13328 established the Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, commonly referred to 
as the WMD Commission. At the time the WMD Commission was reviewing the IC failings until it 
issued its final report on March 31, 2005, the IC’s Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was also conducting a 
thorough search for WMD in Iraq. According to a May 30, 2003 briefing by Dr. Stephen A. 
Cambone, the Pentagon’s Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI), and Major General 
Keith Dayton, U.S. Army, commander of the ISG, the ISG was manned by approximately 1,300 
and 1,400 people. This massive effort was conducted following the 75th Exploitation Task Force’s 
effort which had already searched 300 sensitive sites. The ISG issued its final report on 
September 30th, 2004.[22] The massive ISG effort to find WMD in Iraq coincided with the growth 
and lethality of the insurgency, begging the question: what were the opportunity costs of having 
so many intelligence personal diverted to the WMD search in Iraq for so long?  
Nor has the controversy over Iraq-related intelligence been limited to the WMD issue. On March 
15, 2006, Congress established an independent and bipartisan Iraq Study Group co-chaired by 
former Secretary of State James Baker, a Republican, and former Democratic congressman, Lee 
Hamilton, to independently assess the war in Iraq and to offer policy recommendations. The Iraq 
Study Group issued its final report on December 6, 2006. Buried deep within their final report 
were troubling findings about the quality of the U.S. intelligence effort in Iraq. While the report 
stated that tactical intelligence was good and at times superb, “our government still does not 
understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the militias.”[23] The Study Group found a 
number of human intelligence and analytical shortfalls, and three of the seventy-nine total 
recommendations it offered specifically dealt with ways the IC could enhance its intelligence effort 
in Iraq.[24]  
Clearly secrecy alone did not aid the intelligence efforts mentioned above, and may have delayed 
the proper diagnosis of problems and remedial initiatives. If the Iraq Study Group was still finding 
problems as late as December 2006 that internal IC oversight was failing to uncover much less 
correct, secrecy may have unnecessarily prolonged serious deficiencies in personnel 
management and resource allocation, collection, and analysis.  
In addition to privacy and performance issues, the IC’s secret budgets, involving tens of billions of 
dollars, require vigilant internal and external oversight to prevent incompetent or corrupt officials 
from misappropriating funds. While the overall IC budget remains classified, it is likely greater 
than the last time it was made public in 1997. At the time, George Tenet, then the Director of 
Central Intelligence, in a response to a Freedom of Information Act suit, revealed that overall 
intelligence spending for fiscal 1998 was $26.6 billion.[25] By comparison, NASA’s proposed 
budget for FY 2008 was $18.9 billion.[26]  
There is mounting evidence that a few senior officials misused secrecy to hide fraud and 
corruption during the rapid post-9/11 expansion of intelligence activities. On February 13, 2007, a 
federal grand jury in San Diego indicted Brent R. Wilkes, a Californian businessman, and Kyle 
“Dusty” Foggo, the former third-ranking official at the CIA, on fraud, conspiracy and money 
laundering charges involving former Representative Randy “Duke” Cunningham.[27] In November 
2005, Cunningham was forced to resign from the House after pleading guilty to taking bribes and 
is now serving up to an eight-year prison term. Walter Pincus of the Washington Post notes that 
congressional investigators found that Cunningham “channeled more than $70 million in 
Pentagon and intelligence agency contracts to two companies which paid him bribes.”[28] 
According to the executive summary of the investigation by the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Cunningham’s illegal activities required the “cooperation or at 
least the non-interference of many people”[29] Pincus claims several of the questionable 
contracts involved the Pentagon’s newest and fastest-growing intelligence agency, the 
Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), which was established in 2002 to coordinate the 
protection of defense facilities and personnel at home and abroad from terrorist attacks. CIFA’s 
budget is secret.[30] Of note, according to Pincus, this same organization was at the center of a 
storm in November 2005, when it was learned “The Pentagon pushed legislation on Capitol Hill 
that would create an intelligence exception to the Privacy Act, allowing the FBI and others to 
share information gathered about U.S. citizens with the Pentagon, CIA and other intelligence 
agencies, as long as the data is deemed to be related to foreign intelligence.”[31] At the time, one 
member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), Senator Ron Widen (D-OR) 
claimed, "We are deputizing the military to spy on law-abiding Americans in America. This is a 
huge leap without even a [congressional] hearing."[32]  
Thus, this new intelligence agency, CIFA, created only in 2002, has already found itself embroiled 
in two of the three main reasons for greater transparency and intelligence oversight: ensuring the 
privacy of law-abiding citizens and fiscal accountability.  
Perhaps the most compelling reason for greater transparency in the intelligence process is to 
enhance the credibility of its final product. If intelligence is to be used to drive policy decisions, it 
must be credible for policymakers, legislators and citizens to sacrifice their blood and treasure to 
implement intelligence-driven strategies.  
 
 
Whence the Threat to Intelligence Secrecy? 
All intelligence activities, from collection, processing, analysis, dissemination of finished 
intelligence, to the planning and conduct of risky covert operations, require the participation of 
dozens if not hundreds of cleared personnel, at various levels. Depending on the classification 
level and compartmentalization of the intelligence involved, the final product could be transmitted 
via secure computer networks to thousands of individuals with the appropriate security 
clearances. Therefore, intelligence effectiveness at times demands a high level of involvement of 
“cleared” personnel. Intelligence is worthless if it does not get to the tactical, operational or 
strategic decisionmaker in a timely fashion and in a format he or she can understand and act on. 
However, at the same time, the sheer scope and scale of such an operation increases the risks of 
unauthorized disclosure. The key question is, from where is the greatest threat of compromise to 
sensitive intelligence sources and methods?  
As stated earlier, espionage by well-placed American intelligence officials has caused the 
greatest damage to the IC’s abilities and effectiveness. Over the past two decades, a number of 
high profile espionage cases have come to light. In a July 2002 study by Katherine Herbig and 
Martin F. Wiskof titled, Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947-2001, the 
authors documented 150 cases of espionage against the United States by American citizens 
between 1947 and 2001.[33] In addition to the CIA’s Aldrich Ames (arrested in February 1994) 
and the FBI’s Robert Hansen (February, 2001), there have been dozens of lesser known cases 
that have also done significant damage to the IC’s ability to carry out its mission. Individuals such 
as the former National Security Agency’s (NSA) communications specialist, Ronald W. Pelton, 
who after quitting his job in 1979, sold valuable secrets to the Soviet Union until his arrest in and 
conviction in the mid-1980s; former Navy intelligence analyst Jonathan Pollard, who pleaded 
guilty to spying for Israel in 1986; former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Ana Montes who 
worked for the Cuban intelligence service for 16 years, her entire career as a DIA analyst, until 
her arrest and conviction in 2001-2002, have all caused irreparable damage to American 
intelligence capabilities by giving Hostile Intelligence Services (HOIS) detailed information on U.S. 
intelligence “sources and methods” of collection and “gaps” in our collection or analytical 
capabilities.  
A level below espionage is unauthorized “leaks” of classified information to the media. Some, 
such as the Glomar Explorer example cited above, can have serious financial and intelligence 
collection consequences. However, many are “leaks” of classified material that have more to do 
with policy decisions than intelligence “sources and methods.” Most of these leaks tend to be a 
continuation of internal policy debates that have a more limited impact on sensitive intelligence 
capabilities when compared to the espionage cases mentioned above. As the recent perjury trial 
of the Vice President’s former Chief of Staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, revealed, there has always 
been a symbiotic relationship between senior administration policymakers and the major print and 
broadcast media. During the trial, ten well-known journalists testified that they were provided 
“sensitive” information by multiple senior administration sources.[34] Veteran journalist and senior 
National Public Radio news analyst, Daniel Schorr, claims there is a dichotomy of intelligence 
leaks, “the top-level leak serving some administration purpose, and the unauthorized 
subterranean, whistle-blowing leak that tends to defeat the administration’s purpose.”[35] The 
most famous example of the latter is the leak of the so-called Pentagon Papers on American 
involvement in Vietnam in June 1971. Since the documents dealt mostly with American 
government policy decisions regarding Vietnam over the previous three decades, the impact on 
intelligence effectiveness was negligible. Schorr thinks both types of leaks, while dangerous, will 
continue. He notes that “the ship of state is the only kind of ship that leaks mainly from the 
top.”[36]  
In addition to actual “leaks,” journalists around the world have increasingly stumbled onto 
sensitive intelligence and covert operations abroad. Depending on their nationality, and media 
affiliation, they must then decide whether or not to publish their stories, or hold back at the 
request of the intelligence agencies involved, or even from senior administration officials. This 
phenomenon will likely increases as information tools become increasingly available to both 
established and freelance journalists all networked together in the “blogosphere.”  
My purpose for pointing out these various forms of compromise of sensitive intelligence sources 
and methods is to question the conventional wisdom that Congress is the primary source of 
intelligence leaks, and therefore not trustworthy enough to perform serious oversight 
responsibilities on behalf of its constituents as a co-equal branch of government. The evidence to 
support this harsh accusation is weak. As Lowenthal points out:  
Despite these precautions and the internal rules intended to punish members or staff who give 
out information surreptitiously, Congress as an institution has the reputation of being a fount of 
leaks. This image is propagated mainly by the executive branch, which believes that it is much 
more rigorous in handling classified information. In reality, most leaks of intelligence and other 
national security information come from the executive, not from Congress. (In 1999 DCI Tenet 
admitted before a congressional committee that the number of leaks from executive officials was 
higher than at any time in his memory.) 
This is not to suggest that Congress has a perfect record on safeguarding intelligence material, 
but it is far better than that of the CIA, the State or Defense Departments, or the staff of the NSC. 
The reason is not superior behavior on the part of Congress so much as it is relative levers of 
power. Leaks occur for a variety of reasons: to show off some special knowledge, to settle scores, 
or to promote or stop a policy. Other than showing off, members of Congress and their staffs 
have much better means than leaks to settle scores or affect policy. They control spending, which 
is the easiest way to create or terminate a policy or program. Even minority numbers and staff 
can use the legislative process, hearings, and the press to dissent from policies or attempt to 
slow them down.[37]  
Although the history of congressional oversight is limited to several decades, there is little 
evidence that Congress—especially the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) or the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)—has been a significant source of 
“leaks” that have compromised sensitive intelligence programs, sources or methods.[38]  
While both congressional intelligence oversight committees have been hobbled over the past 
fifteen years by excessive partisanship, inattention in the post-cold war era, and deference to the 
executive branch in the conduct of the war on terror, there are strong indications that 
congressional oversight may soon experience a renaissance. One example is the recent National 
Intelligence Estimate (or NIE) on Iraq, Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead, 
released in late January 2003. One of the most intriguing parts of the unclassified version 
released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was not the document’s 
assessment on Iraq, but the first four of the eight pages which dealt exclusively with how the NIE 
process was conducted. The ODNI also acknowledged that the latest Iraq NIE was requested by 
Congress, not the administration. This is highly unusual; the last time Congress made such a 
request for a National Intelligence Estimate was the 2002 NIE on the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD 
programs.[39] The new House and Senate leadership are also debating changes to committee 
responsibilities to consolidate intelligence-related programs and budgetary powers as well as 
other recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission with regard to their oversight 
responsibilities.[40]  
Finding the Right Balance: Risk Versus Gain 
Intelligence, especially quality all-source intelligence, is not only expensive, it takes a very long 
time to develop, and at times entails significant risks. The intelligence paradox has always been 
that during times when the threat to U.S. national security seems implausible (post-Cold War 
1990s) or remote (pre-9/11 Afghanistan), or both (Germany and Japan during the 1920s and 30s 
interwar period), is when the nation should be the most aggressive recruiting agents, developing 
technical collection capabilities and building the analytical expertise needed for a future crisis that 
may not become urgent for years. Unfortunately, that is often when short-sighted budget-cutters, 
career bureaucrats and executive and legislative leaders become most risk-averse. It is common 
for even the most prudent intelligence initiatives to be shelved during this period. Rapid efforts to 
redress intelligence collection and analytical shortfalls are rarely successful if implemented only 
after a crisis has developed.  
The debate over secrecy and transparency is almost of secondary importance compared to the 
executive and legislative responsibilities to insure the IC is focused on the right problems, is 
developing the right tools, recruiting and retaining the right people, and spending the money 
Congress authorizes and appropriates to various intelligence agencies wisely. The size and 
scope of the U.S. IC’s responsibilities and activities today demand enhanced internal and external 
executive and congressional oversight, not just to protect the rights and security of its citizens—
and the taxpayers’ investment—but also to ensure the IC is on the right track in terms of its focus 
and long-term vision. The American public, and their elective representatives, are entitled to the 
highest standard of performance from their intelligence professionals given the potential impact of 
shoddy or politicized intelligence work.  
Since Pearl Harbor, over four decades of Cold War, and more recently the War on Terrorism, the 
United States has begrudgingly accepted the need for a robust, aggressive and permanent 
intelligence apparatus to protect the nation in an increasingly dangerous world. Ever since World 
War II, we have struggled with the dilemma of maintaining sufficient secrecy to allow the IC to 
operate effectively, and at the same time permitting adequate transparency to allow oversight 
safeguards. The IC’s seventeen agencies—which now include the new Office of the new Director 
for National Intelligence (ODNI)—all posses internal oversight mechanisms such as General 
Councils or Inspector Generals.  
Congress, with a permanent intelligence committee in both the Senate and the House, staffed by 
experienced professionals, and operating with procedures developed over three decades, can 
and should play an important intelligence oversight role. According to Lowenthal, the U.S. system 
is more developed in this area than any other industrialized power.  
In democracies, oversight tends to be a responsibility shared by the executive and legislative 
powers. The oversight issues are generic: budget, responsiveness to policy needs, the quality of 
analysis, control of operations, propriety of activities. The United States is unique in giving 
extensive oversight responsibilities and powers to the legislative branch. The parliaments of other 
nations have committees devoted to intelligence oversight, but none has the same broad 
oversight powers as Congress.[41]  
Yet, a major issue facing the American public with regard to intelligence transparency today is 
whether Congress is structured properly and has the tools to carry out its wide-ranging 
intelligence oversight responsibilities in an effective and bipartisan manner?  
The Way Ahead 
Five and a half years since the 9/11 tragedy, there is little evidence that America’s Global War on 
Terrorism will be ending anytime soon. Like the end of the Korean War, America and its allies are 
settling in for a prolonged conflict with a global ideological foe that is adaptive, resourceful and 
ruthless. Some within the Departments of State and Defense are even trying to rename the 
struggle against this virulent form of radical militant Islam “the Long War” instead of Global War 
on Terrorism. America and its security institutions will have to adjust accordingly if it is to fight an 
effective and prolonged Cold War-like struggle that could possible last decades. The emergency 
powers contained in the Patriot Act will have to be more closely aligned with the traditional civil 
liberties and due process Americans expect in their democracy.  
Congress will have to abandon its episodic interest in intelligence oversight responsibilities and 
invest the necessary time and resources to carry out its duty as a co-equal branch of government. 
The members and staff selected to serve on the HPSCI and SSCI will be confronted by an 
increasing number of complex intelligence-related issues. It will have to hire the best and most 
experienced intelligence staffers if it is to be an effective contributor to making sure the U.S. IC is 
up to the global challenges in the 21st century.[42] This is a tall order given the enormous size 
and scope of the U.S. IC today, and will require major changes in how Congress conducts its 
oversight responsibilities.  
Like the Intelligence Community, the congressional oversight committees have always faced the 
dilemma on whether to focus their limited staff and time on short-term issues (budgets, 
investigations, confirmation hearings, ongoing and emerging crises in certain geographic areas, 
etc.) vice long-term challenges (restructuring the Cold War-era intelligence agencies for 21st 
century challenges; the recruitment, training and retention of a quality intelligence workforce; 
cost-benefit comparative analyses of the various technical collection programs, etc.) As is true 
within the IC, long-term concerns often lose out to the immediate requirements. To ameliorate this 
problem, the congressional oversight committees need to establish an organization designed to 
step back from the daily chores of hearings, investigations and budgetary minutiae and focus on 
the wider and longer-term intelligence challenges facing the nation over the horizon. Such an 
organization already exists in the executive branch. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board (PFIAB) was first created by President Eisenhower in 1953, and has assisted numerous 
presidents since then. It usually consist of senior intelligence and policy officials, including such 
luminaries as former National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, former Senator Warren Rudman 
(R-NH), and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.  
The congressional intelligence oversight committees could benefit from a PFIAB counterpart that 
could take a longer, wider and deeper view and serve as senior consultants on complex 
intelligence issues facing the oversight committees’ members and staff. Distinguished individuals 
with exceptional intelligence credentials such as former Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA); Warren 
Rudman (R-NH); William Cohen (R-ME); and Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) are examples of 
the type of distinguished individuals who should serve on such a Congressional Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board (CFIAB).[43]  
Conclusion 
"If doctors bury their mistakes, intelligence officers tend to classify theirs."  
—Anonymous  
The issues of U.S. IC’s accountability, transparency and effectiveness have taken on increased 
importance following a number of recent failures and an increasingly ominous global security 
environment. The veil of secrecy covering the nation’s intelligence activities will have to be pulled 
back a bit, for a selected group of trusted legislators, judges and media personnel, to reassure an 
anxious American public that the IC is focused on the right enemy, has the appropriate resources, 
and is not trampling the civil liberties of law-abiding citizens as they conduct their important work. 
Besides the considerable financial costs, the political costs of the American public losing 
confidence in the competence and professionalism of its intelligence services can have a 
devastating impact on the morale of IC’s estimated 100,000 employees. Many have already left 
government service for more lucrative, and safer, careers in the private sector. Yet the challenge 
remains for the executive and legislative branches to develop an effective intelligence system that 
can anticipate threats, identify opportunities and protect civil liberties. Since those early days of 
executive and congressional intelligence cooperation in the War of Independence, the record of 
effective congressional oversight of the U.S. IC has been brief and uneven at best. Partisan 
squabbles have seriously hamstrung congressional oversight since the end of the Cold War. Yet 
cooperation between the executive and legislative branches is possible and remains necessary if 
we are to build and maintain the intelligence capabilities this nation desperately needs and 
deserves. 
The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views 
of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
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